Renegotiating Third World Debt by Arabi, Arash S.
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 4
2-1-2003
Renegotiating Third World Debt
Arash S. Arabi
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons, Law
and Economics Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Other Law
Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arash S. Arabi, Renegotiating Third World Debt , 3 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. Iss. 2 (2003)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol3/iss2/4
Renegotiating Third World Debt
Arash S. Arabi'
INTRODUCTION
The vicious cycle of debt is common in today's society. Consumers are
routinely warned of the troubles of becoming mired in debt. Once they amass
a certain level of debt, they cannot repay it in full and interest begins to
mount. It is not uncommon to borrow from one lender in order to pay the in-
terest accumulating on the debt owed to a second lender. Short of a miracle,
completely ending this sort of debt becomes practically impossible. 2
This is the debt crisis facing the Third World. The crisis is one so severe
that it threatens to shatter the economy of countless nations and leaves the fu-
ture of their lenders in doubt. The only viable solution is to come up with an
"alternative" method of dispute resolution to deal with the debt crisis - one
that is a cross between arbitration and mediation. A disinterested body should
be created to recover some, or if possible, all of the outstanding loans owed
to financial institutions, while alleviating the extreme hardships the debt and
current debt repayment methods have inflicted. It should be noted, however,
that the creators of such a solution cannot precede along the lines of tradi-
tional mediation methods. Traditional methods will be futile for the simple
reason that both sides freely admit the loans are outstanding. This fact is un-
disputed. The dispute arises over how to repay the loans and by what
methods.
The first part of this paper will explain what the Third World is; the na-
ture of Third World debt; why the search for a solution for this economic
quagmire is one of the most important tasks facing the world today; and how
1. Student, Pepperdine University School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor
Roger Alford, Pepperdine School of Law, for his valuable insight on the topic and his willing-
ness to share his vast knowledge of international law. The author would also like to thank Profes-
sors Asma Barlas and Naeem Inatuyalla, Ithaca College, for taking my interest in the Third
World and turning it into a passion. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.
2. It might seem off-base to compare credit card debt totaling in the thousands to Third
World debt which is sometimes in the billions, but many may be surprised to know that the pro-
cess that nations go through in procuring loans and repaying them are almost identical to that of
the regular consumer applying for a credit card. The amount a nation receives depends on its
credit history (this will become an important topic in this paper). The repayment plan is very
similar to credit card repayment plans and the interest rate that a nation pays on the loan is, like
a credit card, based on its credit history; however, the interest is more likely to increase and de-
crease than that of a consumer credit line.
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mediation can help. The second part of this paper will focus on why some
form of debt relief is needed and the importance of arriving at a better system
of loan repayment and disbursement than the one currently being employed.
The final part of this paper will pose possible alternative solutions that can
help alleviate the problem of Third World debt without further straining an al-
ready volatile relationship that exists between the lenders and debtor nations,
and most importantly, between the West and The Third World.
I. THE THIRD WORLD AND THIRD WORLD DEBT
A. What Is The Third World?
The Third World is a collection of dissimilar and unstructured groups of
approximately 120 African, Asian, and Latin American nations.3 These na-
tions differ in race, language, religion and historical experience, but what they
have in common, and what places them in the "Third World" category, are
their goals of development.4 Economic development has been, and still is, the
main goal of these nations. However, social, political, and institutional devel-
opment has also become a priority in the last fifty years. 5
B. What Is Third World Debt?
Third World debt became a significant concern during the 1970s when
U.S. banks began to lend extraordinary sums of money to Third World na-
tions.6 This is attributable to the massive influx of cash received when Middle
Eastern countries began depositing oil revenues into U.S. banks. 7 Looking to
3. See Jeremy J. Sanders, The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering Growth in the Global
Market, CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J., Vol. IX, No. 2, at 37, 40 (2000). See also Jeswald W.
Salacuse, From Developing Countries To Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the
Third World, 33 INT'L LAW, 875 (1999). Many Eastern European countries are called "The Sec-
ond World" in that for most of the last century they were satellites of the Soviet Union and thus
not considered a par of the Third World; nor were they considered part of the "West," but were
communist nations still striving to develop.
4. Sanders, supra note 3, at 40. "Development" in the context that these nations strive to
become self-sufficient, increase the standard of living for its citizenry, and increase trade by be-
coming an exporting rather than an importing nation. Id. The irony here is that not all nations
can become solely exporting nations, because there would be no one left to export to. This sug-
gests that some nations will forever have to be "developing" in order for capitalism to continue.
5. See Salacuse, supra note 3, at 875.
6. Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 137
(1989).
7. Enrique R. Carrasco, The 1980's: The Debt Crisis and the Lost Decade Of Development,
9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1l9, 120 (1999). In the 1970s the world's largest oil pro-
ducing nations (with the exception of Norway) created the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
2
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol3/iss2/4
[Vol. 3: 251, 2003]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
make a profit off the cash reserves they had available, U.S. financial institu-
tions began loaning out money, in particular to eager Latin American coun-
tries, without properly assessing the risks involved and correctly calculating
the amount of loans the nations could handle without defaulting.8
The bottom fell out in the 1980s with the coming of a global recession.9
As exports of debtor countries dropped drastically while the dollar gained
strength, and global interest rates soared, the ability of debtor countries to
make timely payments stalled. It became increasingly more difficult to repay
the loans as their interest rates increased.'0 The debtor nations never fully re-
covered from the events of the 1980s and the result has been "massive do-
mestic and foreign borrowing, high and permanent inflation, and, conse-
quently, huge deficit finance.""
Since the cycle began, no entity has succeeded in successfully coming
up with a plan that allows debtor countries to break this cycle. Most of these
debtor countries have been unable to achieve any significant period of eco-
nomic growth. Consequently, Third World nations are in debt well over a tril-
lion dollars. The possibility of default on even a very small portion of this
debt has been enough to create an unprecedented financial crisis, which al-
though very real, has not received the proper attention deserving of its
magnitude. 2
C. How Mediation Can Help
Historically, arbitration and mediation have been looked upon with dis-
Countries (OPEC). Seeking to end competition amongst themselves, and to stabilize oil prices,
OPEC ministers meet a few times a year and collectively set the quota for the number of barrels
a day each member state will produce. The creation of OPEC caused oil prices to skyrocket and
member states benefited greatly from its creation. Members are all from the Middle East with the
exception of Venezuela. The two biggest and most influential are Iran and Saudi Arabia.
8. See Puchala, supra note 6, at 137.
9. See Carrasco, supra note 7, at 120. Ironically, one of the factors people cite as a cause
for the recession was the Oil Crisis.
10. Id. In 1982 Mexico was the first country to declare that it could not pay its foreign
debt. This was quickly followed by Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile. See also Michael F.
Hoellering, World Trade: To Arbitrate or Mediate - That is the Question, 49.1 Disp. RESOL. J.,
67-69 (1994).
11. Tamara Lothian, The Criticism of the Third-World Debt And Revision Of Legal Doc-
trine, 13 WIs. IN'L L.J. 421, 444 (1995).
12. See Puchala, supra note 6, at 137.
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trust in the Third World. 13 In disputes between the Third World and the West,
Third World intellectuals, scholars and politicians argue that arbitration has
tended to favor Western economic interests. 4 As this comment will suggest,
there is much credence to this argument. Many, if not all of the attempts at
alternative dispute resolution, undertaken to resolve the debt crises have been
initiated and/or run by Western nations and financial institutions. 5 Sadly, the
purpose of arbitration and mediation has been lost to the West.' 6 Five factors
allow mediation to be successful:' 7 (1) an impartial third party facilitator; 18 (2)
a third party who vigorously protects the integrity of the proceedings; 9 (3) a
good faith participation from the participants; 20 (4) the presence of all parties
involved; and (5) an appropriate site or venue. If a good faith effort was
made to conduct mediation proceedings with all these five factors present,
there should be no reason why a solution cannot be reached that is beneficial
to both sides, and in particular, to the millions of impoverished people of the
debtor nations.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FINDING A WORKABLE SOLUTION
A. Partial, But Not Complete, Debt Relief is the Answer
Those in the West and in the Third World who object to repayment of
any of the outstanding debt usually cite three reasons. 2' First, many of the
13. Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias
Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419 (2000). Investigating disciplinary
bias in international commercial arbitration.
14. Id. at 419. Although Mr. Shalakany argues in his article that this notion of bias to-
wards the West is completely unfounded, he does not specifically touch upon the subject of me-
diation and arbitration in the Third World debt setting or the current forms of dispute resolution
in place today which, I argue, are heavily pro-Western. Mr. Shalakany skillfully keeps his discus-
sion centered squarely on Asia Minor and completely ignores Latin America and the arbitration
injustices and manipulation that occur in that region of the world.
15. Organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, Clubs of Paris and London and plans
such as The Brady Plan or The Baker Plan have all been the creations of the West or Western
financial institutions.
16. See What Is Mediation?, available at http://adrr.com/adrl/essayi.htm (last visited Jan.
15, 2003).
17. Id.
18. All attempts up to this point have not truly been impartial in that all proceedings have
been run and maintained by Western nations or financial institutions.
19. See id. The impartial Third Party does not exist making it difficult to protect the integ-
rity of the proceedings.
20. The financial institution's only motive is the recovery of its investment, with little or
no regard to the complaints held by the Third World nations.
21. See Lothian, supra note 1I, at 439. Resistance to paying off the debt has existed in the
Third World, and in particular in Latin America, since the 1970s. It has become a yearly ritual
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loans paid out in the 1970s were made to military regimes, particularly in
Latin America, who used the funds for purposes other than helping the citi-
zenry and advancing development.2 2 Although a valid concern, the banks
were all too willing to make loans to military regimes who were eager for
cash and utterly incapable of gauging the amount of debt the country could
shoulder. This is a morality-based argument unsupported by any legal
legitimacy.23
Two arguments that possess less moralistic undertones and incorporate
some legal validity, are that the banks were responsible for the excessive bor-
rowing of the period 4 and that full repayment of the loans would create mas-
sive hardships to the people of the debtor countries.2
The existence of the loans has already created instability and unrest in
debtor nations. The obligation to pay back the loans has "undermined exper-
iences of popular self-government and national self-determination .... ,26
The debtor nation's inability to create any substantive internal development
strategies and invest in the well-being of its people and resources, has under-
mined the entire process of development. Although the loans were initially in-
tended to help the process of development, they have, in fact, done more to
stunt development than any other major development in the Third World.27 As
for Argentina to threaten to default in order to garner more favorable repayment options. The
campaign for complete debt relief has only recently become vogue in the West. Many entertain-
ers have taken up the cause, not necessarily advocating that the debtor nations default on the
loans, but for Western nations to grant debt forgiveness. See Editorial, Africa's Debt Burden,
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Sept. 3, 1998, at 4A.
22. Id. For more on the role of the military in creating debt in Latin America, see JOHN
SHEAHAN, PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, 188-94 (1987).
23. Id. It is highly unlikely that bankers would be willing to give debt relief based on
moral guilt.
24. See KARIN LISSAKERS, BANKS, BORROWERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT 218 (1991)(argu-
ing that the banks had a duty to the debtor nations to calculate and figure out the ability of the
debtor nation to pay back the loan, similar to the way consumer credit companies look at an ap-
plicant's income and outstanding debt to calculate whether the applicant will be able to shoulder
the added debt).
25. See Lothian, supra note 11, at 439-41. The more resources debtor nations are forced to
allocate to repayment of loans, the less resources they have available to provide for an already
neglected society.
26. Id. at 423.
27. See STEPHAN HAGGARD & ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND THE PROS-
PECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, IN THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 319 (Stephen Haggard &
Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992). See also, Lothian, supra note 11, at 423. It cannot be argued
that the debt burden has severely hurt the ability of debtor nations to advance and provide for its
5
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a result, numerous debtor nations have stagnant economies, indicated by un-
employment rates as high as forty percent(40%). 8 Such conditions epitomize
a breeding ground for dictatorships that promote national or ideological unity
but do very little to increase the long-term chances of economic and social
recovery.2 9 In Ethiopia, for example, one hundred thousand children die annu-
ally from "easily preventable diseases while debt repayments are four times
more than public spending on health care (emphasis added)." '30
Although it has become clear that some form of debt relief is vital to the
debtor nations, those who are concerned about the interests and the financial
health of both debtor nations and the lender financial institutions realize that
complete debt relief is not a realistic option. Financial institutions have
loaned billions of dollars and if they do not see some return on their invest-
ment, the repercussions on the world financial markets would prove devastat-
ing to the global economy. 31
Further, financial institutions are not obligated to extend unlimited credit
to debtor countries.32 By completely repudiating the debt, as opposed to for-
mulating a viable solution to the problem, banks will simply cease extending
credit, the potential ramifications of which would be as severe as having too
much debt.3 3 Financial institutions have made it very clear in the past that
failure to honor the debt would "produce an immediate suspension of short-
term credit lines which are essential to sustaining a country's foreign trade." '34
citizenry, as vital income is funneled away from needed social programs and into bank coffers. It
seems also inevitable that to make debtor nations stable, better able to care for their own people,
and better able to pay off financial obligations, some form of debt relief will be needed, either
through debt forgiveness, additional time to pay off loans, or a reduction of interest rates.
28. See Lothian, supra note 11, at 444. For a further discussion on how the debt crisis has
created a fiscal crisis in debtor nations, and in particular Brazil, see Geraldo Biasoto Jr., Divida
Externa e Desequilibrio Financeiro no Setor Publico, 2 ANALISE E CONJUNCTURA 25
(1987)(translated from Portuguese).
29. See Lothian, supra note 11, at 433.
30. Antony Anghie, Time Present And Time Past: Globalization, International Financial
Institutions, And The Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 243, 257 (2000).
31. See Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Sustaining Lender Commitment To Sovereign Debtors, 30
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1992) (highlighting the importance of financial institutions remain-
ing involved in the foreign debt market and providing new techniques that would enable them to
see a return on their investment). Id. at 3.
32. See Carrasco, supra note 7, at 121.
33. See Lothian, supra note 11, at 425-26. Although self-sufficiency and decreasing the de-
pendency of Third World nations on loans are the goals, it is necessary that the option for loans
remains intact. Any nation could be hit by recession, inflation or an environmental catastrophe
and borrowing money might be the only viable option of avoiding complete economic collapse.
See also, Anghie, supra note 30, at 246-51 (concerning the enormous power international finan-
cial institutions wield over the Third World).
34. Lothian, supra note 11, at 426; see also JEFFREY D. SACHS, INTRODUCTION TO DEVELOP-
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More importantly, the danger of a nation unilaterally repudiating its debt will
lead to ostracization from the world economy that will not only cut off access
to loan and risk capital, but direct capital investment in the country, such as
factories and stores, will decrease as well, resulting in further economic
destabilization.35 The United States' interests would be severely affected if fi-
nancial institutions refuse to extend credit to Third World nations. In order to
protect its foreign interests, the U.S. would have to create numerous bail-out
packages to sustain the Third World economies. This would effectively turn
the U.S. government into a creditor and American taxpayers into reluctant in-
vestors, with very little to gain.36
B. Strategic Importance Of A Debt Free Third World
The importance of debtor nations being free of debt is of paramount
concern to both the debtor nations and the West, specifically the United
States, who plays a large and vital role in promoting stability in the Third
World, and, in particular, Latin America.3 7
The resurgence of nationalism that often occurs when nations are unable
to manage their foreign debts is a troubling phenomenon. 38 As American cor-
porations enter these countries and begin to export the products of the peo-
ple's labor with little in return and the nation struggling to meet the basic
needs of its people due to the foreign debt, Anti-Western and Anti-American
sentiment becomes common.3 9 When these national sentiments are not prop-
erly addressed, actions directly endangering American interests abroad begin
ING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989).
35. See Carrasco, supra note 7, at 119.
36. See generally, Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 31. Bail-out packages are usually created to
prop up a nation's economy on the verge of collapse. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 33. The
United States has an incentive to do this, especially in Latin America, because of the billions of
dollars American citizens and corporations have invested in these nations and the need to main-
tain healthy countries to import American goods. Mexico, because of its close geographical prox-
imity and trade with the United States, has been the recipient of numerous bail-outs in the past.
37. See generally Sanders, supra note 3, at 43. Most of the unpaid Third World debt is in
Latin American countries that have historically been most susceptible to default. Id. The eco-
nomic and social effects instability can have in Latin America is of great concern to the United
States. Id. A faltering Latin American economy affects all aspects of the United States, not only
the economy. Id. See also Puchala, supra note 6, at 148.
38. See id. See also, Irene A. Belot, Note, The Role of the IMF and the World Bank in Re-
building the CIS, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 83, 85 (1995).
39. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 43.
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to occur and the capital invested by U.S. corporations in the Third World is
at risk.40 Tamara Lothian, Director of First National Bank of Boston n" feels
that that rising nationalism in debtor countries is a sign of discontent with the
West and Capitalism as well: "the state that begins by repudiating its debt
seems already to have set out on a course of upheaval."' 42 Radical, left-wing
elements have always existed in the Third World 43 but have usually been suc-
cessfully offset by oppressive conservative classes. 44 Occasionally, however,
when left unchecked, these radical elements win the support of the middle
class and are successful in disrupting American interests abroad.' 5
C. Failed Attempts
1. The Brady Plan
Attempting to reach a viable solution for the debt crisis is nothing new;
in the past twenty years both sides have attempted to formulate plans to re-
solve the crisis. Unfortunately, failure is the typical result as each side at-
tempts to maintain its own interests rather than searching for a resolution
beneficial to all parties.
Financial institutions have frowned upon politicians attempting to ad-
vance solutions for solving the debt crisis.4 6 One such plan that received a
40. Id. It is very common for the United States to bear the brunt of criticism in any coun-
try where Nationalism takes root, be it the Third World or Europe, due to American Corporations
visibility throughout the world. This constant visibility is a clear reminder of the United States'
political and financial dominance.
41. A respected bank that no doubt has outstanding loans, which it would like to have
repaid.
42. Lothian, supra note 6, at 437. Anti-capitalism is more of a concern than general Anti-
West or anti-U.S. sentiment, because although Anti-U.S. feelings might affect American tourists
abroad, anti-capitalism sentiment affects American capital invested in the Third World. See id. at
437. This is not intended to mean that money could ever be considered more important than
human lives, but for Lothian and other bankers, protecting their company's capital is of para-
mount concern.
43. It is fairly well known that Latin America has radical Marxist factions who have had
success in their political struggles. These Marxist factions receive support and gain popularity
from the negative attitude towards foreign debt and investment. For an unbiased look at social-
ism, see NANCY S. LOVE, DOGMAS AND DREAMS: POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE MODERN WORLD,
179-342 (1991).
44. Lothian, supra note 11, at 437.
45. Id. at 437.
46. See Puchala, supra note 6, at 138. One such plan that was vigorously resisted was The
Baker Plan. In the late 1980s, The Baker Plan, proposed by former U.S. Secretary of the Trea-
sury James Baker, was composed as a three party strategy, adoption by debtor countries of
growth-oriented domestic reforms and a three-year $9 billion increase in World Bank lending. It
never received the full support of the business community needed to ensure its survival. See, Ec-
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warm response by many in the U.S. government, and some in the business
community, was the "Brady Plan."' 47 A commentator called it "the freshest
and most realistic approach to the international debt crisis."' 48 The Brady Plan
called for banks to assist with voluntary debt reduction while offering Third
World countries new money at lower interest rates and more manageable pay-
ment options.49 In exchange, the Third World nations receiving Brady Plan
assistance would be expected to undertake radical reform and restructure their
economies along the lines of the Western market-oriented economies. 0
The underlying basis of the Brady Plan seems to make sense: debt relief
in exchange for a more market-friendly system that will hopefully allow the
debtor nation to better handle its financial commitments in the future. In prac-
tice though, the Brady Plan posed problems for both sides, and in the end no
one has appeared willing to allow it to succeed. For a plan such the Brady
Plan to be successful, full cooperation from both sides is needed.5'
The problems the Brady Plan posed for debtor nations will be discussed
shortly, as they nearly parallel the problems posed by the suggestions of the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Banks had no real incentive to
forgive a significant amount of debt for promises of economic restructuring,
because the policy changes called for by The Brady Plan benefited Western
governments more than the financial institutions.52
onomic Policy Council of UNA-USA Third World Debt: A Reexamination of Long-Term Manage-
ment 15 (Sept. 7, 1988).
47. See Puchala, supra note 6, at 138. The Brady Plan was a polished version of The
Baker Plan. Id.
48. Id. (Alfred J. Puchala, Jr.; B.A., 1983, Yale; J.D., 1988, Georgetown.)
49. Id.
50. Id. The country's progress towards reform would be closely scrutinized and all future
debt relief and new money would be conditioned on the nation's aggressively continuing towards
market reform.
51. See Lothian, supra note 11, at 426. The key distinction is whether "the confrontation .
* . occurs under the aegis of a political project enjoying widespread support in the society" or
one which causes discontent with the people and the financial institutions as well. Id.
52. See Puchala, supra note 6, at 139. Financial institutions now agree that some form of
debt relief needs to be worked out for them to see any sort of return on their investments. The
problem with the Brady Plan was that financial institutions felt they were making the sacrifice,
but the eventual benefit of the sacrifice would flow more towards western governments than the
banks. The Brady Plan was proposed during the end of the Cold War when the idea of having
countries rapidly turning to capitalist free market societies was a major political victory for capi-
talist nations. Additionally, this would benefit western corporations who wished to invest in the
Third World, although such reform didn't necessarily mean more money for the banks. Id.
9
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2. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have re-
ceived more criticism than praise for their handling of the international debt
crisis.53
The World Bank was created in 1944 by the victors of World War II in
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. 4 After meeting its initial goal of recon-
structing Europe's battered economic infrastructure, the World Bank began to
focus most of its efforts in the Third World.55 Today the World Bank sells
shares to nation states and provides loans to developing countries with the
proceeds. 6 The Vice-President of the World Bank states the organization's of-
ficial purpose as being "the alleviation of poverty, the fulfillment of basic
human needs for nutrition, safe drinking water, education, health and housing,
the concern for the settlement of people affected by large development
projects, the role of women in development, and preserving the environ-
ment." 57 Critics of the World Bank would say the organization has com-
pounded these problems rather than alleviated them.5
The IMF was established at the same time as the World Bank, in Bretton
Woods.59 Unlike the World Bank, an organization that tries to deal with a
host of issues such as human rights and potable water, the IMF is strictly
concerned with international monetary markets, free trade, capital investment,
foreign exchange stability, debt and debt repayment. 6° In exchange for its as-
53. See Carrasco, supra note 7, at 124.
54. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 37. Members from forty-four nations attended the meet-
ing. Their primary purpose was to rebuild the international economic system that was ravaged by
a decade long depression and World War II. For a further discussion of the meeting see Michael
P. Malloy, Note, Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a Changing World, 62 FORDtAM L.
REV. 1911 (1994).
55. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 37. Although the reconstruction was done in speedy and
magnificent fashion, The World Bank cannot take full responsibility for Europe's quick recovery.
See generally, Jim Chen, Pax Mercatoria: Globalization As A Second Chance At "Peace For
Our Time", 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 217, 228 (2000). Practically all of the credit goes to the im-
plementation of The Marshall Plan in 1947. Id. The World Bank, overall, has very few accom-
plishments for which to be proud. Id.
56. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 37. The decision to give loans is based on a majority
vote of the representatives holding shares in the World Bank vote. The United States has the
most control in the World Bank because it has more than eighteen percent of the voting power
"which equals nearly three times the amount of Japan, the next largest share holder." Id.
57. Id., quoting Malloy, supra note 54, at 179.
58. See PAUL CAMMACK, THIRD WORLD POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 12 (John
Hopkins, 2d ed. 1993).
59. Id. at 38.
60. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 38. The IMF's charter sets out six main objectives: 1) to
promote "global cooperation by providing the institutionalized machinery for consultation and
10
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sistance, the IMF asks for three things from Third World Nations: (1) reign in
spending (as opposed to increasing taxes) by cutting back on public invest-
ment; (2) use earnings from exports to pay back debt, rather than finance the
importation of needed goods; and (3) privatize almost all aspects of society.6'
Although the idea of creating alternative "independent" organizations to
attempt to solve global issues (such as Third World debt) is the main objec-
tive, the World Bank and IMF have not lived up to the expectations of many,
particularly the Third World nations. First, the World Bank and IMF are not
genuinely independent 62 - at least they do not share the same level of inde-
pendence one would typically associate with an arbitrator or a mediator.63 As
noted, industrialized nations such as the United States, Japan, Germany and
Great Britain play influential roles in both the World Bank and IMF.64 In a
dispute between a Western financial institution and a Third World country,
the IMF and the World Bank does not appear to be the bias-free mechanism
needed to mediate the conflicts and create substantive policies that will solve
the debt crisis.65
Further, both organizations are accused of magnifying human misery in
k
collaboration of members on global monetary issues"; 2) to promote a balanced growth in inter-
national trade, with the hope of creating higher employment and income and "the development
of productive capacity of members"; 3) to promote stability in exchange arrangements and in ex-
change rates in order to counteract currency devaluation; 4)to create a "multilateral system of
payments and transfers" for monetary transactions in hopes of not hindering the expansion of
world trade; 5) to "make convertible financial resources available to member states, on a tempo-
rary basis with appropriate safeguards, in order to permit these states to correct international pay-
ment imbalances"; and 6) to reduce the amount and duration of these imbalances. Id.
61. Lothian, supra note 11, at 442. It is clear by these three requirements that the IMF is
not the impartial mediator necessary to solve the problem of Third World debt, when it structures
its requirements to benefit western financial institutions.
62. As already noted, neither the World Bank nor the IMF can implement a debt resolution
program or disburse any form of financial assistance to a Third World nation without the ap-
proval of member states. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 37.
63. Id. at 38. The World Bank and the IMF cannot act without the approval of shareholder
states (industrialized nations), unlike a mediator who would be independent.
64. See Anghie, supra note 30, at 244.
65. The fact that the United States alone can veto any World Bank policy decision, or an
attempt to resolve financial disputes, makes it clear that the World Bank cannot be the impartial
mediator needed to solve the Third World debt problem. Most of the financial institutions that
have outstanding Third World loans are United States' institutions. See Christopher Gottscho,
DEBT-EQUITY SWAP FINANCING OF THIRD WORLD INVESTMENTS - WiLL THE I.R.S. HINDER U.S. SWAP-
PERS?, 8 Va. Tex Rev. 143, at 146, 147 (1988).
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the Third World, something their respective charters claim they want to end.66
The World Bank and IMF's system of requiring debtor nations to implement
massive market-based reforms, for which most of the countries' internal
structures are not ready, in exchange for financial assistance is credited with
driving these Third World nations into deeper despair and exasperating the
debt crisis rather than helping to resolve it.67 These requirements came to be
known as "globalization," i.e., duplicating the Western model of economy
throughout the world, regardless of social and political consequences in the
Third World.68 Antony Anghie, an Associate Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Utah states, "Even scholars who assert that globalization is largely
beneficial argue that globalization causes extensive social dislocation that
needs to be remedied by increased state-sponsored social welfare
programs. 69
The shortsighted requirements by the IMF and World Bank and the fail-
ure to arbitrate the issue of foreign debt in an impartial and realistic way,
have caused the poor, women, children, and indigenous peoples to suffer
"disproportionately as a result of structural adjustment programs" since the
1980S.70 Numerous studies have shown that the stabilization and structural ad-
justment programs the IMF and World Bank forced debtor nations to under-
take have not resulted in the intended consequences. 7 In most Third World
nations, these programs have led to a significant widening of the gap between
rich and poor, shrinking salaries, high unemployment, malnutrition, and inad-
equate health care.72
66. See Carrasco, supra note 7, at 120 (illustrating the complete collapse of the IMF and
World Bank in their attempts to solve the debt crisis).
67. Id. at 119. The market-reform requirements of the IMF and World Bank are very simi-
lar to that of the aforementioned Brady Plan.
68. See Anghie, supra note 30, at 255.
69. Id. These countries are diverting huge amounts of money from social development pro-
grams to (a) pay back loans, (b) implement aggressive privatization campaigns, (c) undertake ef-
forts that stabilize inflation, and (d) attract foreign investors in infrastructure. These programs
routinely displace people, bring very low wages, and transform the economic structure from one
that is self-sufficient based on agriculture to one that is dependent on exports as most farm work-
ers migrate to the cities to work at these new factories. See id.
70. Carrasco, supra note 7, at 124.
71. Id.
72. Id. The studies do not show uniform despair in all of the countries. Some regions of
the world, such as Latin American and Africa have been hit much harder then other places that
have initiated reform programs such as Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Id. It should
be noted that these areas have not "benefited" from these programs as the IMF and World Bank
would have hoped, but only that they have not been hit as hard as Latin American and Africa.
Id. This cannot possibly be attributed not to the idea that globalization tends to work if given
time, but rather that many of the Eastern European nations had additional assistance from West-
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Whether the IMF and World Bank have achieved their true objectives is
not clear; what is clear is that they have failed in reaching the goals set out
in their respective charters. The reason the IMF and World Bank have not
been able to solve the debt crisis is clear: they have never acted as a true me-
diation body seeking the fair resolution to the debt crisis dispute rather than
gains for itself and its members.73
3. Securitization of Third World Debt
Securitization is the private sector securitizing Third World bank loans
and then selling the securities to institutional investors or individual inves-
tors.7 4 The benefit of this approach is the absence of despotic mandatory re-
quirements on debtor nations.75 Most often, an independent entity is created to
hold the loans and the cash flow that is generated from the loans is disbursed
to bondholders.7 6 Many contend that securitization is the only way that ques-
tionable credit risks can be renegotiated.77
Supporters of securitizing Third World debt argue that such a process
would "relieve the strain on financial institutions"7 while benefiting the
debtor countries by transferring the loans as a security to a more financially
stable base of investors.79 The presumption is that the security investors will
ern European nations and the Middle East. (Resources from oil, for example, have helped greatly
to prop up the governments).
73. The World Bank and IMF are controlled by industrialized nations, in particular the
United States. Politicians set the agenda for the World Bank and IMF. Politicians are elected with
the use of donations from corporations and financial institutions, mainly in the form of "soft"
money. To get reelected the politicians need to appease their real constituents, the financial insti-
tutions. Which side does the World Bank and IMF favor? The answer is clear. See generally
Sanders, supra note 3.
74. See Puchala, supra note 6, at 137. Securitization "involves the pooling and repack-
aging of loans into securities, which are then sold to investors" (quoting Pavel, Securitization,
ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVES. FED. RES. BANK OF CHICAGO 16 (July/Aug. 1986).
75. Puchala, supra note 6, at 137-38. The carrot and stick approach is not used in securi-
tization because the debtor nations are not involved in the transfer of the loan into a security. Id.
The financial institutions are allowed to pass the risk on to other investors and Third World na-
tions are allowed to continue feeding their citizens. Id.
76. See Puchala, supra note 6, at 137-38. This technique is nothing new, and is frequently
used in residential and commercial mortgages, car loans, and credit card receivables. Id.
77. Id. at 143.
78. Id. at 139.
79. Id. Some experts believe that a contributing factor to the problem of Third World debt
is that many of the financial institutions are financially troubled and unable to compromise or ne-
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be better situated to allow the debtor nations to work through short-term
problems.80 The main reason is that securities, unlike loans, are insured and
pass interest and principal.8'
Although securitizing Third World debt is an intriguing response and one
that can play a role in alleviating the crisis, it should not be seriously consid-
ered as a final solution. Even the staunchest supporters of securitizing the
debt believe that it is not a complete solution, but one that could "serve as a
component of a comprehensive plan" that a disinterested international organi-
zation might devise in dealing with the debt crisis.82
4. The Clubs of Paris and London - The First Step Towards Alternative
Dispute Resolution
The Club of Paris and the Club of London are dispute resolution forums
that resolve disputes between creditor and debtor countries (Club of Paris)
and between commercial banks in creditor and debtor countries (Club of
London).8 3 A Professor of Economics calls the two Clubs "case studies in ef-
fective dispute resolution and a specialized form of mediation. '8 4 Their pur-
pose is to (for the first time) resolve international disputes on an international
stage while solving the enforcement difficulties that routinely plague alterna-
tive dispute resolution and mediation.85
The Club of Paris began in 1956 for the purpose of "settling controver-
sies concerning debts that were guaranteed or owed by [Third World] govern-
ments to creditor governments. ' 86 The Club's membership includes "most of
gotiate effectively, needing to see immediate returns on their investment. See id. at 142.
80. Id.
81. See id. Long-term investors would be content receiving the interest from these instru-
ments. See also, Michael Quint, Marketplace: Expanding Roles in Selling Loans, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1988, at D6, Col. 1.
82. Quint, supra note 81, at D6. Securitization would best be used as a short-term fix
while a more substantive plan is devised by a disinterested organization.
83. Mashaalah Rahnama-Moghadam,The Clubs Of London & Paris: International Dispute
Resolution in Financial Markets, 53 Disp. RESOL. J. 71 (1998).
84. Id. Mashaalah Rahnama-Moghadam is an Associate Professor Of Economics at the De-
partment of Economics & Geography, at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas.
85. See Hoellering, supra note 10, at 67-69.
86. See Moghadam, supra note 83, at 71. The idea for the Club of Paris arose in 1956
when Argentina threatened to default on all of its international loans. Id. at 72. All of Argentina's
creditors met in Paris to discuss strategy and the ramifications that a default by Argentina would
have on the world financial markets. Id. In these meetings, which Argentina initially did not at-
tend, the creditors decided that it would be in their "best interest" to renegotiate the loans with
Argentina in exchange for certain concessions and assurances that would reduce the risk of future
defaults. Id.
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the world's larger industrialized nations." '8 7 Like the Club of Paris, the Club
of London is an informal organization, which concerns itself not with debts
owed to western governments, but Third World debt owed to private commer-
cial banks.8 Supporters of the Clubs claim that since their creation, the Clubs
have resolved every case that has come to them and the debtor nations have
either fully repaid their loans or are currently working to pay them off.89
Supporters credit this success to the Club's concept of "self-reliance,
rather than third-party intervention and entanglements of third parties." 9 Al-
though both Clubs are operated by creditors, the notion exists among their
supporters that the Clubs' members recognize a "fundamental" interest in
working out loan agreements that are mutually beneficial. 91 Supporters claim
this mutually assured benefit enables the clubs to resolve all disputes they
hear.92 Simply put, the two sides will be forced to reach some sort of agree-
ment if the costs of disagreement exceed the cost of agreement. 93
87. Id.
88. Id. at 72-73. The Club of London is much more informal than the Club of Paris, and
does not have a permanent chair or secretariat; but, the negotiation of debt restructuring is much
more structured than in the Club of Paris. To negotiate a particular debt restructuring, the creditor
banks form a Bank Advisory Committee (BAC) which is represented by all the creditor banks.
The nationality of each creditor bank is taken into consideration so as to draft all plans in com-
pliance with local tax and regulatory schemes of the respective countries. The BAC negotiates as
a single body with the debtor nation, but once a negotiated package is created, the signature of
all creditor banks is needed for final approval.
89. Id. It should be noted however, that since both Clubs are "voluntary associations" not
every case of international debt comes before them and they certainly have a choice in which
disputes they hear. It is not at all unlikely that the two Clubs pick only the disputes with the
highest possibility of success.
90. Id. at 73. The third-party intervention (referred to by Mashaalah Rahnama-Moghadam)
is the intervention of western countries. Id. Rahnama - Moghadam proposes that any involve-
ment by nation states would be to the detriment of debtor countries - citing European nations
taking over the finances of Tunis in 1869, Egypt in 1880, Greece in 1898 and the case of Vene-
zuela in 1902, in which British gunboats persuaded Venezuela to repay its debt or face invasion.
Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 71. What the Clubs supporters fail to mention is why they believe the Clubs'
creditor members have the best interests of the debtor nations in mind and what those interests
are. Is it the long-term health of the nation and its citizenry, or merely the short-term interest of
stabilizing the government enough so that it can repay its debts?
93. Id. at 73. In the case of creditors, if the debtor country defaults, this means a loss of
future interest payments. Default by the debtor country means loss of future access to world fi-
nancial markets. This theory was first put forward by Sir John Hicks in his 1963 work. SIR JOHN
R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES (2nd ed., 1963).
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What these supporters conveniently leave out is the fact that the potential
costs of disagreement differ for financial institutions and countries. Where the
cost of disagreement for a financial institution will be lost revenue, for a
debtor country it can mean the loss of lives and the collapse of the social
structure. What supporters of the Clubs of London & Paris fail to recognize
is that most of the time a country is forced to come to the bargaining table
because debt obligations are destroying any possibility of social stability and
social welfare in the country.9 4 In such a climate, financial institutions, under
the guise of a mutually beneficial renegotiation package, might impose upon
the country even higher interest rates in exchange for a renegotiated payment
plan.
There should be no confusion that the Clubs' main purpose is to enable
financial institutions the ability to continue doing business with Third World
nations while not missing out on any interest payments. 95 Although the under-
lying premise of the Clubs appears noble, the fact is that they are self-
described as being impartial. 96 They are willing to negotiate with debtor na-
tions if it means they can see some form of return on their investment. Their
main concern is clearly not the economic, political and social health of the
debtor nation.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. The Creation of Slow-Growth Economic Programs
A contributing factor to the current debt crisis has been the reluctance of
Third World nations to implement long-term solutions, choosing instead
"quick fix" methods that only bandage the problem while exasperating it in
the long-term. 97 In trying to come up with quick fixes, Third World nations
routinely turn to exploitation of their natural resources as a way to generate
94. See id. Some of these supporters are: Mashallah Moghdam, David A. Dilts, and
Hedayeh Samavati. David A. Dilts is Professor Of Economics And Labor Relations at Indiana
University in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He is an arbitrator and a member of the National Academy of
Arbitrators. Hedayeh Samavati is Associate Professor Of Economics at Indiana University, Fort
Wayne.
95. See id. at 73. The author (who has nothing but praise for the Clubs) admits that, "the
self-interest of the parties are more clearly observable than in most other processes." Id.
96. Id.
97. See Molly J. Moline, Debt-For-Nature Exchanges: Attempting To Deal Simultaneously
With Two Global Problems, 22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 133 (1991). Financial institutions are
equally, if not more so, to blame for the lack of long-term solutions. Their insistence on timely
interest payments forces Third World governments into such dilemmas. See generally Anghie,
supra note 30, at 249-50.
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income to pay for interest payments. 98 To counter the problem of environmen-
tal destruction and the exploitation of natural resources, the term "sustainable
development" is gaining increasing popularity.99 "Sustainable development"
is a kind of economic development, which is "guided by an environmental
understanding that strives to benefit from the natural resource base without
destroying it." ioo In Latin America, the region of the world with the most for-
eign debt, 140,000 acres of tropical forest are cut every day for timber, culti-
vation, and cattle grazing."3' Through the introduction of slow-growth eco-
nomic programs, Third World countries are encouraged to handle their
resources in such a way as to make viable the productivity of these resources
for many years to come. 102
In order to implement a slow-growth program, the countries heavy bur-
den to quickly pay on interest needs to be relaxed and this is where "debt-
for-nature swaps" comes in. 103 A debt-for-nature swap is an "agreement
whereby a portion of a debtor nation's foreign debt is retired in exchange for
that country's pledge to institute environmental protection programs." "4 Debt-
for-nature swaps require the debtor nation, the financial institution and a third
party (usually a private conservation organization), to work closely together. °5
The third-party purchases Third World debt, usually with a significant dis-
count from the bank, and negotiates with the debtor nation to forgive the debt
in exchange for the implementation and the authority to oversee environmen-
tal protection programs. 06
98. See Sullivan, Building Economies and Saving Trees, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 4,
1988, at 3, col. 3 (asserting that environmental protection and economic development go hand in
hand. Development of the economy should use up no more resources than can naturally be
regenerated).
99. See Moline, supra note 97, at 134.
100. Id. The accelerated exploitation of natural resources will not allow the resources to
regenerate naturally, causing their disappearance, which can have catastrophic consequences on
the long-term health of the country and its people. Id. at 135.
101. See Nina M. Dillon, The Feasibility of Debt-For-Nature Swaps, 16 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 127 (1991).
102. See Moline, supra note 97, at 134; see also, Sullivan, supra note 98, at 4, col. 3.
103. See id.; See also Dillon, supra note 85; see also Work & Smith, Using Red Ink to
Keep Tropical Forests Green, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 6, 1980, at 49.
104. Dillon, supra note 85, at 128.
105. See Moline, supra note 97, at 138. Debt-for-nature swaps are "financially complex
and politically delicate." Id. (quoting Work & Smith, supra note 95, at 48).
106. Id. Once the third party purchases the debt, the organization negotiates with the
debtor nation's central bank, which will redeem the debt and "issue local-currency bonds
17
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This is an innovative alternative solution to traditional debt negotiation
programs in that it offers something of interest to all sides. Through this solu-
tion, the financial institutions free themselves not only of high-risk invest-
ments, on which they see little return, but major public relations issues as
well. The Third World nation works off its debt for a fraction of what it
would cost if it continued to make interest payments, while at the same time
healing its environment and conserving vital natural resources for future gen-
erations. Finally, conservation groups get concessions from foreign govern-
ments for environmental protection programs that they would not normally
have access to if not for debt-for-nature swaps. Innovations such as debt-for-
nature swaps will allow the Third World to rid itself of foreign debt. It is cur-
rently the most practical solution of paying off debt while abstaining from
damaging the nation's social, environmental, political, and financial
infrastructure.
B. Mediation That Subjects Third World Debt To The Rules Of Law
The unequal bargaining power that Third World nations possess is undis-
puted. 107 Organizations established to solve the debt crisis, by so-called First
World organizations, not only possess the autonomy that will allow for the
beneficial resolve of the dilemma, but are also seen as legitimate in the eyes
of impartial observers. 08 The only way impartial negotiations can become a
reality is through the use of impartial mediation. 1 9 But, this is not the type of
dispute resolution that has historically been practiced in the realm of Third
World debt. Before mediation can be successful the debts must cease being
treated as fixed obligations and must rather be viewed as public obligations
subject to the same rules as domestic contract disputes."10 Once the loans are
equivalent to the total debt." Id. These bonds are issued in the name of the organization. Id. An
example of this method at work is the debt-for-nature swap by Conservation International with
Bolivia in 1987 when Conservation International purchased $650,000 of Bolivian debt. Id. at 139.
In return Bolivia would establish an endowment fund of $250,000 to "cover the operating costs
of managing the Beni Biosphere Reserve in the northeastern region of Bolivia." Id.
107. Lothian, supra note 11, at 460. Lothian suggests that debtor nations as borrowers in
the "commercial real ...enjoy few prerogatives in the matter of debt repayment." Id. For the
most part the loans are considered "relatively fixed obligations." Id.
108. See id. Because the loans are considered fixed obligations, there is no ability to nego-
tiate the heart of the dispute - the amount of the loan. Renegotiating the interest payments or
the payment schedule is only a temporary fix, but does not go to the heart of resolving the crisis.
109. See Shalakany, supra note 13, at 421.
110. See Lothian, supra note 11, at 460. Treating the loans as binding contracts would
open the door for debtor nations to dispute the amounts and the obligation to pay them back. Id.
See also, IAN BROWLINE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990) (making the argu-
ment that government financial obligations should be treated differently than private obligations);
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subject to regular contract law, debtor nations will be able to argue duress',
adhesion contract"', unfairness and unequal bargaining power 13 as a way to
either reduce the loan amounts or have the contracts voided entirely.'
4
As previously mentioned, many of the debtor nations continuously bor-
row to merely pay back interest due on past loans. Even the staunchest sup-
porters of the current system could not disagree that this creates an inherently
unequal bargaining power that in turn creates poverty, oppression and legiti-
mate anti-Western sentiment" 5 in debtor nations.
116
It is not my argument that all Third World debt should be voided. In fact
contractual debts should be renegotiated, paid and enforced; but, the greatest
emphasis should be placed on maintaining and promoting economic sover-
eignty, political democracy and autonomy and not in spite of it." 7 Impartial
mediation can assure the viability and longevity of such goals in a way that
no current "Western" implementation for solving this crisis can ever
envision.
Gary W. Larson, Comment, Default in Foreign Sovereign Debt: A Question for the Courts?, 18
IND. L. REV. 959, 965 (1985) (arguing that the borrowing of money by sovereign nations is a
commercial activity).
I 1. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (2001). "Undue influence is unfair
persuasion of a party who is under the domination of the person exercising the persuasion or
who by virtue of the relation between them is justified in assuming that that person will not act
in a manner inconsistent with his welfare." Id. at § 177(1). "If a party's manifestation of assent
is induced by undue influence by the other party, the contract is voidable by the victim." Id. at §
177(2).
112. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract prepared entirely by one party to the
transaction for the acceptance of the other. See, Max True Plastering Co. v. United States fidelity
& Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861 (Okl. 1996). An Adhesion Contract is voidable if it is unconsciona-
ble. Id. If a court finds a contract to be unconscionable it may "refuse to enforce the contract, or
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 208 (2001)..
113. Unfairness and inequality of bargaining power are factors for finding a contract to be
unconscionable. See, Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 850 (101h Cir. 1986).
114. See Lothian, supra note 11, at 460.
115. See generally, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third
World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J.
529, 540 (discussing the radicalism and anti-Wester sentiments that are created in Third World
nations).
116. See Anghie, supra note 30, at 257.
117. See Lothian, supra note 11, at 462.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The crisis engulfing the Third World is currently so severe that at times
it appears no amount of alternative dispute resolution can fix the problem. To
a great extent this is correct. Alternative dispute resolution and impartial me-
diation are not the final solution, but they are a start to recognizing the most
basic premise that current financial attitudes and policies towards the Third
World are causing massive destruction of basic principles valiantly defended
in the West. Fundamental principles of self-determination, sovereign govern-
ance and the right to live depend on the resolution of this crisis.
Third World debt has crippled the development of countless countries
and in its place has created numerous despotic governments that pay little or
no attention to the basic human needs of its citizenry while destroying liber-
ties at home and threatening them abroad. It is imperative of those in the
West to help create solutions that will alleviate this great harm and help rec-
ognize the humanity of those that are suffering. Mediation and other forms of
alternative dispute resolution is a start to solving the problem. Alternative dis-
pute resolution though, by itself, is tantamount to trying to prop Africa up
with LegosTM as the entire continent crumples before our eyes. The crisis en-
gulfing the Third World will never be solved until the West recognizes its
hand in it.
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